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A B S T R A C T
Over the past 50 years, family formation trajectories have undergone major changes in the events that occur as
well as in the timing and order of these events. Whereas previous studies showed when and how these shifts
occur, not much research has been conducted to test why these changes have taken place. This paper tests two
possible explanations, namely cultural (secularization) and economic (youth unemployment) change using the
Fertility and Family survey of the Netherlands conducted in 2008. We also employed a new method, Competing
Trajectories Analysis (CTA), which combines features of sequence analysis and event history analysis, to examine
the relationship between secularization and youth unemployment and pathways into adulthood. Our results
show that the start of family formation is postponed in times of high secularization and youth unemployment,
when pathways including early marriage and parenthood become less popular, and cohabiting without having
children becomes more popular.
1. Introduction
Demographic pathways into adulthood have changed considerably
over the past 50 years. Key markers such as leaving the parental home,
marriage, and parenthood have been postponed. At the same time,
other events such as entering unmarried cohabitation, having a child
outside marriage, and union dissolution have gained in popularity both
in the US and Europe (Billari & Liefbroer, 2010; Cherlin, 2010;
Thornton, Axinn, & Xie, 2007). This has led to destandardization and
diversiﬁcation of family formation trajectories (Brückner & Mayer,
2005; Elzinga & Liefbroer, 2007; Shanahan, 2000). Nowadays, more
variation exists in the type of family trajectories than in the past.
The literature proposes several views on why these family formation
trajectories have changed. One set of explanations emphasizes cultural
change, focusing on the processes of secularization and individualiza-
tion that weakened social norms regarding the appropriate timing and
ordering of demographic events. It has also been suggested that the
emergence of new social norms has led to new typical family formation
pathways (Lesthaeghe, 2010, 2014). Another set of explanations em-
phasizes structural and economic change, and focuses on processes of
economic globalization and concomitant changes in the welfare system
that increased economic uncertainty (Blossfeld, Klijzing, Mills, & Kurz,
2005; Brückner & Mayer, 2005).
Attempts to test these competing views on the drivers of demo-
graphic change during young adulthood usually examined the inﬂuence
of cultural and economic factors on single transitions such as the timing
of leaving home (Aassve, Arpino, & Billari, 2013; Aassve, Cottini, &
Vitali, 2013), timing of cohabitation and marriage (Sassler &
Goldscheider, 2004), entry into parenthood (Sobotka, Skirbekk, &
Philipov, 2011), having children within cohabitation (Schneider &
Hastings, 2015), or divorce (Schaller, 2012). Studies that apply holistic
methods to demographic pathways into adulthood are usually de-
scriptive. This article aims to address this gap in the literature by testing
whether changes in the demographic pathways into adulthood during
the last four decades have been inﬂuenced by macro-level cultural and
economic changes. Speciﬁcally, we examine the extent to which the
timing of the start of family formation process and the pathways during
the ﬁrst ﬁve years after that start among Dutch young adults are in-
ﬂuenced by changes in the level of secularization and youth un-
employment in Dutch society. Examining the extent to which cultural
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T
or economic factors drive changes in the family formation process may
clarify whether these changes occur as a result of a desired choice or as
a form of coping with societal conditions.
To study the eﬀect of cultural and economic macro-level changes on
family pathways into adulthood, we develop a new analytical proce-
dure, namely Competing Trajectories Analysis (CTA), based on a com-
bination of sequence analysis (SA) and event history analysis (EHA). In
many current applications of SA, the resulting pathways are strongly
inﬂuenced by diﬀerences between subgroups in the timing of the ﬁrst
event (for most people the timing of leaving home, sometimes in con-
junction with the establishment of a union or entry into parenthood).
We disentangle the inﬂuence of cultural and economic change on
timing and order of events by conducting an SA on demographic
pathways during the ﬁrst ﬁve years after young adults experienced the
ﬁrst event in the transition to adulthood. Next, we estimate a competing
risk event history model with the resulting pathways as competing
risks. This enables us to study the inﬂuence of micro- and macro-level
variables on the timing of the start of the family formation process and
type of pathway followed. Since competing risks models allow the in-
clusion of time-varying covariates, this approach provides a way to
include dynamic information on changes in cultural and economic
circumstances in the period leading up to the start of the process in an
analysis of the interdependencies between the main events marking the
transition. More generally, we suggest that the CTA procedure is useful
when studying processes that start in the same initial state. This is
generally the case for the family formation process—where the large
majority of young people usually start by leaving the parental home—,
but also applies to other situations, such as recovery from job loss
where all trajectories start in the unemployed state.
To test our hypotheses on macro-level inﬂuences on family forma-
tion pathways into adulthood, we used retrospective data from the
2008 Dutch Fertility and Family survey (Statistics Netherlands, 2008).
Family formation pathways can be described based on detailed in-
formation regarding leaving home, union formation and dissolution,
and parenthood. The Netherlands is an ideal context to study macro-
level inﬂuences on the transition to adulthood, because of the sharp
increase in secularization and substantial ﬂuctuations in economic
circumstances during our time of study.
2. Hypotheses
Two narratives (Van de Kaa, 1996)—one cultural and one eco-
nomic—have been dominant in explaining long-term trends in family
trajectories into adulthood. The cultural narrative—usually equated
with the Second Demographic Transition theory (SDT)—suggests that
the growing secularization and individualization in modern societies
increased the value that individuals and couples attach to autonomy
and made them more reluctant to make far-reaching commitments
(Lesthaeghe, 2010, 2014). Consequently, young adults increasingly
postpone marriage and parenthood or even forego one or both. Fur-
thermore, they increasingly opt for living arrangements that require
less attachment to a partner, such as cohabitation and LAT (living apart
together) relationships. Generally, one can argue that young adults,
after leaving the parental home, are more likely to choose living ar-
rangements that require less commitment and are more reversible, such
as living alone or cohabitation. Liefbroer and Corijn (1999) suggested
that living arrangements and family events can be ranked in terms of
their irreversibility and required level of commitment. They argued that
parenthood is irreversible, while union formation is not, and that
marriage requires more long-term commitment than cohabitation.
Consequently, they ranked parenthood ﬁrst, followed by marriage and
then cohabitation in terms of irreversibility and commitment.
Lesthaeghe (1983) emphasized the link between secularization and
these family developments even before the terminology of the SDT was
developed. In his view, long-term trends towards secularization not
only inﬂuenced the ﬁrst demographic transition—with its emphasis on
a shift from quantity to quality of children viewed as an expression of
altruism—but also the second transition—with its emphasis on a shift
from altruism to self-realization (Lesthaeghe, 2014). Dobbelaere (1981)
described secularization as a process in which not only fewer people felt
an attachment to religion and in which religion as an institution lost
much of its grip on society, but also as a process in which religions
became reluctant to specify their demands on followers and in which
the interpretation of divine teachings became more abstract. As Chris-
tian religiosity was strongly aligned to traditional family values, both
types of processes increased people’s autonomy to opt for alternative
living arrangements.
Much literature links individual religiosity (or parental religiosity)
to family attitudes and family behaviors (e.g., Berghammer, 2012), or
links country-level religiosity to country-level family formation and
dissolution rates (e.g., Kalmijn, 2007). Peri-Rotem (2016) studied the
changing inﬂuence of individual religiosity on fertility across cohorts in
Britain, France, and the Netherlands. However, only a few studies
empirically examined the link between macro-trends in religiosity and
family behaviors in young adulthood. Esteve, Lesthaeghe, and Lopez-
Gay (2012) observed a positive relationship between secularization and
the popularity of unmarried cohabitation between 1970 and 2007 in
some Latin American countries, excepting Brazil. The lack of studies
that directly examined the inﬂuence of secularization on the family
formation behaviors of young adults implies that the evidence about
this issue is largely indirect. Individual-level studies found that religious
young adults are more likely to follow traditional family trajectories
into adulthood (Berghammer, 2012), including a higher likelihood to
marry (Eggebeen & Dew, 2009; Manting, 1996), a smaller likelihood to
cohabit (Eggebeen & Dew, 2009; Manting, 1996), early parenthood and
more children (Peri-Rotem, 2016), and a smaller likelihood to divorce
than non-religious young adults (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006). In addi-
tion, the proportion of religious young adults in Western societies is
declining over time (Knippenberg, 2015). Combining these two results
implies that secularization must have led to a decline of pathways that
include marriage and early parenthood, and increased pathways that
include unmarried cohabitation and single living.
Thus, the cultural narrative of the SDT suggests that the increasing
secularization will decrease the preference for early family formation.
Therefore, we expect that in more secularized times, young adults will
postpone strong commitments and opt for less committal and more
reversible family arrangements. Aligned to this reasoning, we formulate
two hypotheses:
The higher the level of secularization, the more young adults will
delay the start of the family formation process (H1).
The higher the level of secularization, the more young adults will
start the family formation process via pathways that require less com-
mitment and are more reversible (H2).
The second narrative on long-term changes in family formation
processes stresses the role of economic factors. The idea that young
adults postpone events that entail strong or irreversible commitments
like marriage and entry into parenthood during times of economic
hardship has a long tradition within demography. For example, Butz
and Ward (1979) mentioned that fertility decreases during periods
when the incomes of men decrease as well. This is aligned to Easterlinös
(1980) thesis that children’s consumption aspirations during adulthood
reﬂect their consumption opportunities in the parental home. During
economically bad times, achieving these aspirations is diﬃcult, and
young adults consequently postpone strong family commitments. Re-
cently, these same arguments are used to discuss the family formation
consequences of the Great Recession (Sobotka et al., 2011) and in-
creasing economic globalization (Blossfeld et al., 2005). Research on
the Great Recession focuses on whether the deep economic crisis of the
late 2000s and early 2010s has led to a postponement of fertility as
young adults become reluctant to enter parenthood during the crisis,
because they are either more likely to be unemployed or less willing to
jeopardize their career opportunities by having children. Globalization
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theory argues that economic globalization increased economic in-
security among young adults, and this economic insecurity—and re-
lated factors such as unemployment, temporary forms of employment,
and low wages—increased young adults’ reluctance towards far-
reaching and irreversible family-related commitments. Thus, the eco-
nomic situation not so much inﬂuences the preferences of young adults
to make commitments, but their (perceived) opportunities to engage in
such commitments.
Numerous empirical studies examined the relationship between
economic trends and family behaviors in young adulthood. Youth un-
employment and economic recession decreases the rate of household
formation and leaving home both in Europe (Aassve, Arpino et al.,
2013; Aassve, Cottini et al., 2013) and the US (Lee & Painter, 2013).
Youth unemployment also delays marriage (Schaller, 2012; Schneider &
Hastings, 2015). Furthermore, Schneider and Hastings (2015) found
that the level of unemployment during the Great Recession positively
relates to the rate of non-marital fertility. However, overall levels of
fertility tend to decrease during economically bad times (Sobotka et al.,
2011).
The economic narrative thus suggests that the opportunity for
young adults to commit to ﬁrm family ties decreases in times of eco-
nomic insecurity. Therefore, we expect that in uncertain economic
times, young adults will postpone strong commitments and opt for fa-
mily arrangements that are less committal and more easily reversible.
Parallel to the hypotheses formulated for the cultural narrative, we
formulate two hypotheses:
The less favorable the economic prospects of young adults, the more
young adults will delay the start of the family formation process (H3).
The less favorable the economic prospects of young adults, the more
young adults will start the family formation process via pathways that
require less commitment and are more reversible (H4).
Next to these two key storylines, other narratives stress the role of
institutional factors, such as the development of the welfare state and
the role of educational expansion in changing the process of family
formation. A strong welfare state facilitates early emancipation of
young people, for instance by providing unemployment beneﬁts,
housing subsidies and bursaries that allow them to set up an in-
dependent household (Breen & Buchmann, 2002). Educational expan-
sion inﬂuences family formation processes, because young people who
are highly educated enter marriage and parenthood later than young
people with low levels of education (Blossfeld & Huinink, 1989), and a
general increase in the level of education will therefore lead to a gen-
eral delay in the family formation process. This storyline implies that a
shift in the proportion of highly educated young people drives changes
in the family formation process. Clearly, these diﬀerent types of nar-
ratives are interlinked, with educational expansion, individualization,
and economic development partially showing parallel trends along long
time periods. Given limited information on educational trajectories in
our dataset, we will focus on the role of secularization and economic
development, and only present additional information on the role
played by educational attainment in an Appendix.
3. Method
3.1. Data
To test our hypotheses, we used retrospective data from the Dutch
2008 Fertility and Family survey (Statistics Netherlands, 2008) on 5357
respondents. Probability sampling was used to draw a nationally re-
presentative sample from the Population Register. There was a non-
response rate of 40%, which is lower than in most surveys conducted in
the Netherlands (Mooyaart & Liefbroer, 2016). The survey provided
weights to correct for non-response based on gender, age, level of ur-
banization, country of birth, marital status, and the realized number of
children of women. Respondents were aged between 18 and 62 years at
the time of the survey. There was an even distribution of men and
women in the data, namely 51% women and 49% men.
3.2. Independent variables
In this article, we focus on the eﬀect of secularization and youth
unemployment. Beside these covariates measured at the macro level,
several micro-level covariates were included as control variables in-
cluding age, parental education, having a religiously practicing mother,
and parental divorce. All continuous variables were standardized to
facilitate the comparison of eﬀect sizes. Table 1 provides detailed in-
formation about each of these covariates. Aside from the name of the
variable, Table 1 speciﬁes the level (micro or macro), coding (dummy
or continuous standardized variable), and a detailed description.
Secularization was operationalized as the percentage of non-be-
lievers from 1970 to 2008. The data was taken from Becker and De Hart
(2006). We used linear approximation to impute values for years with
missing data. Youth unemployment was measured as the annual per-
centage of unemployed people between the ages of 15 and 25 years
(Statistics Netherlands, 2012). Fig. 1 presents the evolution of these two
macro-indicators in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2004. Secular-
ization shows an almost linear evolution. Youth unemployment pre-
sents a diﬀerent trend with three local maxima in 1983, 1994, and
2004, coinciding with well-known economic recessions in the Nether-
lands.
3.3. Dependent variable: trajectories
Family-life trajectories were built based on the main events marking
Table 1
Description of covariates.
Variable Level Coding Description
Age Micro Stand. Standardized age of the respondent
Parental education Micro Stand. Father and mother’s education are coded as follows in the original data: 1) primary school or less, 2) lower secondary education,
3) upper secondary education, 4) tertiary professional education, 5) university education. We recoded this into a continuous
variable using the International Standard Level of Education (ISLED) (Schröder & Ganzeboom, 2013). Finally, the average of the
father and mother’s education is taken to obtain one parental education score.
Parental divorce Micro Dummy Information is available on whether someone experienced a parental divorce and the age at which this occurred. This information
was used to create a dichotomous time-varying variable of parental divorce, in which a 0 (no parental divorce) becomes a 1 once
parental divorce occurs. Those who experienced a parental divorce before age 15 start with a 1.
Practicing mother Micro Dummy This binary variable is operationalized using the frequency of church visits of the mother as reported by the respondent. The
categories “rarely or never” and “no church member” are coded as 0, while all the other categories (“less than once a month” or
more frequently) are coded as 1.
Secularization Macro Stand. Operationalized as the percentage of non-believers in the years 1970 to 2008. Missing data were imputed using linear
approximation between the previous and next available years.
Youth unemployment rate Macro Stand. Annual information on the percentage of unemployed people aged between 15 and 25 years from 1970 to 2008 collected by
Statistics Netherlands (2012).
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the transition to adulthood. We considered the following four dimen-
sions: leaving or returning to the parental home, starting or ending a
spell of unmarried cohabitation, getting married or divorced, and
having a ﬁrst child (considered irreversible). Considering all possible
combinations of these four dimensions is not relevant, since some
combinations are rare. For this reason, we considered all situations
where someone lived with parents and was simultaneously in another
situation—married, cohabiting, or having children—as one state. We
refer to those who are not in a union as singles. Thus, we distinguished
eight possible states: (1) living in the parental home; (2) living in the
parental home while being married, cohabiting, or having child(ren);
(3) left parental home and single; (4) left parental home and single with
child(ren); (5) left parental home and cohabiting; (6) left parental home
and cohabiting with child(ren); (7) left parental home and married; and
(8) left parental home and married with child(ren). Fig. 2 presents the
chronogram of the trajectories between the ages of 15 and 35 years.
From this, it is clear that some variation exists in the age at which
young adults experience the ﬁrst demographic event in the transition to
adulthood. Most individuals leave the parental home during their late
teens and early twenties.
3.4. Analytical approach
Family trajectories are often studied using Sequence Analysis (SA),
which is based on the calculation of sequence dissimilarity between
trajectories taken as a whole (Bras, Liefbroer, & Elzinga, 2010; Elzinga
& Liefbroer, 2007; Robette, 2010). This holistic view of family forma-
tion pathways is achieved by considering the timing, sequencing, and
spacing of family related events (Studer & Ritschard, 2016). Most of the
time, these dissimilarities are computed using the optimal matching
algorithm, and are subsequently used to build a typology of the tra-
jectories using cluster analysis (See Studer, 2013 for a review). This
typology is thought to summarize the main patterns of trajectories.
Alternatively, Event History Analysis (EHA) incorporates a number
of methods for modeling the duration between two events, such as birth
and leaving the parental home. EHA can handle censored observations
and thus allows the inclusion of individuals whose trajectories are not
fully observed. Furthermore, several methods within the EHA frame-
work allow measurement of the inﬂuence of time-varying explanatory
factors on the occurrence of a given event or of competing events
(Courgeau & Lelièvre, 1993; Mills, 2011; Therneau & Grambsch, 2000).
SA has several advantages over the more standard EHA
Fig 1. Evolution of secularization (dashed line, scale on the left y axis) and youth unemployment (solid line, scale on the right y axis). For the secularization indicator, points that were
imputed by linear approximation are drawn with a plain circle.
Fig. 2. Chronogram of trajectories between ages 15 and 35 years. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
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methodology (Halpin, 2003; Robette, 2010; Shanahan, 2000). First,
EHA usually focuses on single events, and thus pays relatively little
attention to interdependencies between events. Often, these inter-
dependencies are particularly relevant. For example, according to
Billari, Philipov, and Baizán (2001), the simultaneity of some events
such as leaving home and marriage reveals speciﬁc social norms that
should be studied on their own. Extending this interpretation, the se-
quencing of events conveys meaningful information that merits joint
study; for example, getting married directly or after a spell of cohabi-
tation do not reveal the same social norms.
Second, Shanahan (2000) noticed that the turning points of a tra-
jectory such as the transition to adulthood are usually less well deﬁned
and delimited than assumed by the analysis of a single event. For ex-
ample, leaving the parental home is often analyzed as a speciﬁc and
unique event, even if it may be a gradual process marked by back and
forth movement (Shanahan, 2000).
However, SA also has serious limitations when studying family
formation trajectories. First, to avoid anticipatory analysis (Hoem &
Kreyenfeld, 2006), the method can only be used to study the eﬀect of
covariates measured at the beginning of the trajectory. If we include a
covariate measured later, we would explain part of the trajectory by
some of its outcomes. For example, if we study the eﬀect of the level of
education at age 25 on family-life trajectories between ages 15 and 35
years, one would explain the beginning of the trajectory (from ages 15
to 25) based on future levels of education. This limitation prevents the
use of time-varying factors such as parental divorce or the youth un-
employment rate.
Second, if all trajectories start with the same state, the resulting
typology often mainly distinguishes between trajectories that diﬀer in
the timing of the ﬁrst event. For example, in the study of the transition
to adulthood, the typology often distinguishes between those leaving
earlier or later, but experience the same kind of process thereafter. In
other words, the time spent in this ﬁrst state often plays an important
role in the resulting typology. Depending on the issue under in-
vestigation, this might be problematic for two reasons. First, since we
usually only consider a restricted number of types (i.e., less than 10),
the distinctions made according to the time spent in this ﬁrst state may
hide other—possibly important—distinctions, such as diﬀerences in the
sequencing of states. Second, using only two or three categories (typi-
cally an early or late start) to fully describe the timing of the process
might be too crude of an approximation. This is especially problematic
in the study of the family formation process, where many explanatory
factors such as youth unemployment are expected to postpone the
process. From a statistical perspective, using only two or three crude
categories, we may fail to properly estimate postponement of the tra-
jectories.
Third, SA aims to analyze processes holistically. For this reason, one
can only analyze fully observed processes. Individuals with censored
sequences (i.e., not fully observed) are usually ignored. This implies
that trajectories of the youngest cohorts in a sample are often dropped
from the analysis, even if these cohorts are of interest. On the other
hand, EHA provides an appropriate approach to handle censored ob-
servations.
3.5. Competing Trajectories Analysis (CTA)
To overcome these limitations, we propose Competing Trajectories
Analysis (CTA), a procedure which combines key elements of SA and
EHA. We ﬁrst use SA to study the sequencing and spacing of the main
events in the family formation process. Second, we employ the EHA
framework to study the timing of the start of the transition process and
the kind of trajectory followed. By separating these two aspects, namely
the timing of the ﬁrst event and the sequencing and spacing of the
events that follow the start of the family formation process, we can
study the trajectory in more detail. Moreover, time-varying explanatory
variables measured up to the time of the ﬁrst event can be included in
the analysis, enabling a better understanding of how they shape the
transition to adulthood.
3.5.1. Extracting the sequences
More speciﬁcally, our method proceeded as follows. First, we ana-
lyzed sub-sequences of a predeﬁned time span. If t is the time of the ﬁrst
observed event in the sequence and ℓ a predeﬁned time span, we ex-
tracted the sub-sequences between positions t and t + ℓ. In other words,
we focused on a sub-sequence observed for a predeﬁned time span and
aligned to the ﬁrst observed change in the whole sequence. Second, we
studied these extracted sub-sequences using SA.
Fig. 3 shows ﬁve example of family formation trajectory sequences.
We studied the sub-sequences of length ℓ=60months (i.e., 5 years).
For the ﬁrst individual, this sub-sequence is highlighted by a red box
and starts at time t=48months after the beginning of the trajectory
and lasts for ℓ=60months. Practically, this means that the ﬁrst (green)
part of the sequence—the ﬁrst spell of 48 months in the “parental
home” state—is not used in building the sequences, but in the second
stage to study the timing at which the family formation process starts.
We end with a sub-sequence starting with the event of “leaving the
Fig. 3. Five example sequences of the transition to adulthood. The sub-sequences of events within a ﬁve-year window after the ﬁrst event are highlighted by a red box. Vertical bold black
bars indicate censoring. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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parental home” and lasting for ﬁve years. In this particular case, the
ﬁve-year window does not capture all events of the trajectory.
For the second individual, the extracted sub-sequence starts with
another event (i.e., either starting cohabitation, getting married, or
having a ﬁrst child), but has the same length of t=60months. Finally,
the third sequence does not start in the parental home state. In this case,
we assume that the ﬁrst event occurred at time t=1, i.e., before the
start of the sequences. For this reason, this extracted sub-sequence
starts at the ﬁrst time unit. However, note that with the appropriate
selection of the age from which the family formation process is studied,
sequences of this type will be rare.
We only extracted fully observed sub-sequences of length ℓ. This
means that we did not extract sub-sequences for individuals who have
not observed any event (e.g., the ﬁfth sequence in Fig. 3) and in-
dividuals who have not been observed for ℓ time units after the ﬁrst
event (e.g., the fourth individual in Fig. 3). In both cases, the sub-se-
quences are not included in the ﬁrst step of the analysis, namely the
analysis of a frequent/ideal-typical combination of events. In both
cases, these individuals should be considered as censored observations
at time c= L− ℓ, where L is the length of the sequence. The time limit c
is justiﬁed in that after c, it is not possible to observe a full sub-sequence
of length ℓ. These censor time limits are illustrated in Fig. 3 using a
vertical black bar. They are included in the EHA as censored observa-
tions. The only sequences that cannot be included in the analysis are
those with length L that is shorter than the sub-sequence length ℓ. In
this case, the censor time limit c is negative, showing that these se-
quences could not be observed.
After extraction, SA methods (Abbott, 1995; Studer, 2013) can be
used to cluster sub-sequences into a limited number of types. These
ideal-typical sub-sequences can be interpreted as typical ways in which
to start the family formation process.
3.5.2. Combining sequence analysis with event history analysis
Once the typology is built, we analyze which factors inﬂuence the
type of start to the family formation process and timing using a com-
peting risk model. The use of the EHA framework is particularly justi-
ﬁed for two reasons. First, it allows studying the timing of the start of
the transition. Second, it allows including individuals with censored
observations in the analysis.
The proposed combination of EHA and SA should be mutually
beneﬁcial. The use of SA enables to cope with multiple states and events
and their possible interactions, while the use of EHA makes it possible
to partially handle censored observations and analyze the timing of the
process. This combination does not add much complexity to the usual
SA framework, where sequences are clustered before running multi-
nomial regression. Here, we change these two steps by incorporating
timing and censoring in the second one.
The behavior of the proposed analytical procedure is highly de-
pendent on the length ℓ of the considered sub-sequence. If ℓ is long, then
we analyze a large part of the sequence, which enables the study of mid-
or long-term eﬀects and interdependencies in the trajectories. At the
extreme point, we are almost in the standard SA framework. We ana-
lyze only complete sequences with multinomial logistic regression and
remove all incomplete sequences. The handling of censored observation
is therefore irrelevant and no time-varying covariates can be studied.
However, if ℓ is shorter, fewer observations are removed and fewer
sequences are considered as censored. The CTA procedure can therefore
better handle censored observations. Furthermore, when ℓ is short, it is
more likely that time-varying covariates that operate during the period
before the start of the subsequence are related to behaviors in the short
following subsequence. At the extreme point, when ℓ=1, the analysis
is equivalent to the competing risk model with similar handling of
censoring and time-varying covariates. We therefore need to make a
tradeoﬀ between these two extreme points by optimizing the sub-
sequence length ℓ. In this study, we opted for a sub-sequence length of
60 months (5 years). We did so for two reasons. First, the ﬁrst few years
after the ﬁrst event in the family formation process is often a demo-
graphically dense period, as many demographic events tend to cluster
during this period (Rindfuss, 1991). Second, it seems likely that societal
conditions that inﬂuence the timing of the start of the family formation
process also considerably inﬂuence events in the ﬁrst few years after the
process starts, as young adults might already anticipate some future
family-life events. If the period ℓ becomes very long, a causal eﬀect of
societal conditions at the start of period ℓ on events much later during
this period becomes increasingly unlikely.
4. Results
4.1. Trajectories into adulthood
We extracted 4827 sub-sequences using the procedure described
above. 10% (530) of cases were censored. Quite logically, men from
later cohorts are overrepresented among the censored cases, as men
family formation tends to start later among men than among women.
Distances between the extracted sub-sequences were calculated using
optimal matching, which is more sensitive to diﬀerences in spacing and
duration than other distance measures according to simulations pre-
sented in Studer and Ritschard (2016). This is what we were looking
for, since we expected increasing spacing between the events marking
the transition to adulthood. Next, partitioning around medoids was
used to derive a typology of pathways into adulthood (Kaufman &
Rousseeuw, 2005)
We retained a typology with seven groups. The average silhouette
width (0.54) of the cluster solution showed good clustering quality for a
sequence analysis (Kaufman & Rousseeuw, 2005), suggesting that the
clusters are distinct. Fig. 4 presents the state distribution plots for the
seven pathways to enter adulthood. Note that the proportion of cases
classiﬁed in each type do not include censored observations (around
10% of cases). As a recall, censored observations result from reduced
observation time, or from individuals that did not experience any
events. We brieﬂy describe all pathways below, based on the most
common trajectories.
• Parental home (7%): Individuals classiﬁed in this type start their
family trajectory with an event other than leaving the parental
home. As a result, they live in the parental home with a partner, a
child, or both. Individuals moving back and forth from the parental
home are also classiﬁed in this category.
• Singlehood (32%): Individuals start their transition by leaving the
parental home and remain single (i.e. not in a cohabiting relation-
ship) for the subsequent ﬁve years.
• Singlehood-cohabitation (9%): Individuals leave the parental
home, and stay single for about two years before starting to cohabit
unmarried.
• Cohabitation (16%): Individuals leave their parental home to co-
habit for the whole period. Some experience a short episode of
singlehood. As this episode is usually very short, one might think
that cohabitation was already anticipated at the time of leaving the
parental home.
• Cohabitation-Marriage (6%): These individuals leave the parental
home to cohabit for an average of two years before getting married.
This type might reveal a “testing” pattern in contrast to the previous
type, which involves more long-term cohabitation.
• Marriage (15%): Individuals leave the parental home to get mar-
ried immediately for the whole period of ﬁve years.
• Marriage and Children (17%): These individuals are characterized
by a rapid process with all key events happening within a ﬁve-year
window. Individuals typically leave their parental home to get
married immediately before having a child in the following two or
three years.
This typology highlights diﬀerent ways to start the family formation
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process. We now turn to the second step of our analysis, in which we
studied the factors inﬂuencing the timing and kind of start of family
formation trajectory using EHA.
4.2. Factors inﬂuencing the start of the transition to adulthood
Before analyzing the type of trajectories taken by young adults, we
ﬁrst analyze the timing of the start of the family formation process.
Following our methodological approach, this start is deﬁned by the ﬁrst
event marking the transition to adulthood, namely leaving home
(single), unmarried cohabitation, marriage, or parenthood. Our ty-
pology highlighted that for over 90% of non-censored respondents, this
event entails leaving the parental home.
We estimated a discrete time model by performing a logistic re-
gression analysis on a monthly person-period data ﬁle starting at 15
years old. Three models were estimated separately for men and women
to test our hypotheses. All models included the control variables age (as
a third-degree polynomial transformation of standardized age),1 level
of parental education (standardized), having a religiously practicing
mother, and parental divorce. Our time-varying macro-level covariates
for secularization and youth unemployment were also standardized and
added separately to Models 1 and 2 respectively. Model 3 includes both
macro-covariates.2 Table 2 presents the log-odds coeﬃcients of these
logistic regressions.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis states that entry into adulthood is delayed in
more secularized times. Generally, results are in line with H1. Model 1
shows that young men and women both tend to start the transition into
adulthood later in highly secularized periods. However, the eﬀect for
women becomes statistically insigniﬁcant if we control for the un-
employment rate (see Model 3). We also hypothesized that the timing of
entry into adulthood is delayed in times of high youth unemployment
(H3). Indeed, we observed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the youth unemploy-
ment rate, which as expected, is associated with postponement of the
timing of the start of the transition to adulthood. This relationship is
observed for men and women. These results conﬁrm our third hy-
pothesis.
Regarding the control variables, we observed a strong eﬀect of the
level of parental education. Young people with highly educated parents
tend to start their process earlier. This could be related to more op-
portunities of entering higher education, which may entail that they
have to leave the parental home for their education. Interestingly, the
eﬀect is signiﬁcantly stronger for men than for women.3 Young adults
with a religiously practicing mother tend to start their transition to
adulthood later than young adults whose mother is not religiously ac-
tive. Finally, we observed a strong eﬀect for parental divorce. In-
dividuals with divorced parents tend to start their transition to adult-
hood earlier than individuals whose parents did not divorce.
4.3. Factors inﬂuencing family formation trajectories
We now focus on our hypotheses regarding the inﬂuence of macro-
level cultural and economic conditions on the type of family formation
trajectories. To test the hypotheses, we estimated a competing risk
model of the rate to experience each type of trajectory as identiﬁed in
our typology. The model is estimated using a discrete time model (a
multinomial regression analysis on a person-period ﬁle) and the results
presented in Table 3 for women and Table 4 for men. We only present
the full models, which include both the secularization and young un-
employment covariates.
We ﬁrst focus on the results regarding H2, namely that in more
secularized times, young adults will be less likely to start the family
formations process via trajectories that imply strong commitment to a
partner and children. To facilitate interpretation of the results, Fig. 5
illustrates the evolution of the estimated hazard to start each for men
and women in times of low and high levels of secularization. These
proﬁles are estimated for a young adult with a reference proﬁle, which
includes the average youth unemployment rate, average parental
Fig. 4. Distribution plot of the typology of family formation trajectories. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this
article.)
1 We used a suﬃciently complex transformation of age to ensure that the measured
eﬀects of the other covariates are not related to age. The degree of the polynomial was
chosen by maximizing goodness-of-ﬁt statistics on all models (see Tables 2–4).
2 The operationalization of these variables is presented in the data section.
3 We tested for the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence of the coeﬃcient of men and women
by estimating a single model (for men and women together) with an interaction between
sex and the level of parental education.
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education level, non-practicing mother, and non-divorced parents.
The results in Table 3 indicate that in times of increased secular-
ization, women are less likely to enter the family formation process
through more “traditional” trajectories that focus on marriage or
marriage and parenthood. In contrast, young adults are more likely to
opt for singlehood and cohabitation trajectories. In Table 4, the results
for men mirror these results. In more secularized times, men are less
likely to opt for marriage and marriage and children trajectories and
Table 2
Discrete Time Models of the Start of the Family formation trajectory.
Female Male
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept −3.65*** −3.66*** −3.65*** −4.49*** −4.51*** −4.50***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 1.19*** 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.42*** 1.40*** 1.42***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Age2 −1.00*** −1.01*** −1.01*** −0.49*** −0.49*** −0.49***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Age3 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Parental education 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.23***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Practicing mother −0.11* −0.09* −0.10* −0.11* −0.09 −0.10*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Parental divorce 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.34** 0.32** 0.34**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Secularization −0.05* −0.03 −0.08*** −0.07**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Youth unemployment −0.07*** −0.06** −0.07** −0.05*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
AIC 25128.01 25121.34 25121.79 23305.98 23309.88 23303.91
Num. Obs. 167546 167546 167546 204800 204800 204800
*** p < 0.001.
** p < 0.01.
* p < 0.05.
Table 3
Women: Competing trajectories model of the type of family formation trajectories.
Parent. Singl. Singl.-cohab. Cohab. Cohab.-Marriage Marriage Marriage-kids
Intercept −6.63*** −5.15*** −5.93*** −5.45*** −6.05*** −5.95*** −5.75***
Age 1.17*** −0.02 0.51** 1.42*** 1.87*** 2.46*** 1.90***
Age2 −0.34 −1.27*** −1.26*** −1.14*** −1.57*** −1.96*** −1.25***
Age3 0.02 0.66*** 0.50*** 0.15 0.33 0.40** 0.27**
Parent. education 0.06 0.46*** 0.33*** 0.15** 0.09 −0.02 −0.50***
Pract. mother −0.60*** 0.12 −0.18 −0.57*** −0.49** 0.41*** −0.03
Parent. divorce 0.90** 0.11 0.33 0.60*** −0.38 −0.29 0.31
Secularization −0.13 0.10** 0.09 0.51*** 0.13 −0.59*** −0.36***
Youth unempl. −0.03 −0.09* 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.10 −0.12*
Likelihood ratio χ2= 2730.99 (df= 56)***
*** p < 0.001.
** p < 0.01.
* p < 0.05.
Table 4
Men: Competing trajectories model of the type of family formation trajectories.
Parent. Singl. Singl.-cohab. Cohab. Cohab.-Marriage Marriage Marriage-kids
Intercept −7.42*** −5.45*** −6.56*** −6.51*** −7.67*** −7.19*** −7.32***
Age 1.24*** 0.09 0.97*** 2.13*** 2.54*** 3.23*** 3.34***
Age2 −0.61 −1.06*** −0.67*** −0.60* −0.99* −1.51*** −1.46***
Age3 0.10 0.55*** 0.18 −0.13 0.07 0.16 0.13
Parent. education −0.10 0.49*** 0.37*** 0.17** 0.09 −0.02 −0.27***
Pract. mother −0.52* 0.04 −0.50*** −0.59*** −0.18 0.26* 0.19
Parent. divorce 0.82* 0.36* −0.17 0.56** 0.21 0.24 −0.25
Secularization 0.06 0.05 0.22** 0.46*** 0.26** −0.64*** −0.58***
Youth unempl. −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 0.02 0.23* 0.13* −0.08
Likelihood ratio χ2= 2713.25 (df= 56)***
*** p < 0.001.
** p < 0.01.
* p < 0.05.
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more likely to opt for trajectories that include cohabitation such as
singlehood-cohabitation, cohabitation, and cohabitation-marriage.
These diﬀerences are graphically represented in Fig. 5. In periods of low
secularization, both genders’ transition to adulthood is dominated by
the two trajectories of marriage and marriage and children. The main
diﬀerence is that the rates of these trajectories for men peak at a
somewhat later age. Interestingly, the parental home trajectory
(starting the transition with an event other than leaving the parental
home) shows an increasing hazard rate with age. Women are more
likely to experience it if they did not leave home until a later age. In
periods of high secularization (the right-hand panels in Fig. 5), the
cohabitation trajectory dominates for both women and men. For
women, the singlehood trajectory also becomes more common, as does
singlehood followed by cohabitation. The latter peaks at a later age
than does the singlehood trajectory. Among men, an increase in the
likelihood of the singlehood-cohabitation” trajectory is also observed,
particularly at older ages. These results conﬁrm our second hypothesis,
since we observed a rise in family formation trajectories characterized
by less irreversibility and a lower commitment to a partner or children.
The likelihood of cohabitation instead of marriage increases and the
transition to parenthood is postponed.
Hypothesis 4 suggests that less irreversible transitions that imply a
stronger commitment to a partner and children are less likely in eco-
nomically bad times, even if the coeﬃcients are less signiﬁcant than the
ones for secularization. The results in Tables 3 and 4 partly corroborate
this. In economically bad times, women demonstrate lower rates of
entering the marriage and children trajectory. However, women are
also less likely to opt for a singlehood trajectory during periods of high
youth unemployment, suggesting that in uncertain economic times it
becomes more diﬃcult to establish individual independence. The esti-
mates for men in Table 4 suggest—somewhat surprisingly—that the
marriage and cohabitation-marriage trajectories become more popular
in periods of high youth unemployment. The results in Fig. 6 clarify
these results, as they show that in periods of low unemployment men
aged 25 years and more are characterized by the “cohabitation” and
“marriage and children trajectories, but that in periods of high youth
unemployment, the marriage trajectory replaces the marriage and
children trajectory. This suggests that early fatherhood is postponed in
economically bad times.
Finally, the eﬀects of the control variables are worth noting.
Diﬀerences according to the level of parental education are similar for
men and women. Those with highly educated parents have a higher
likelihood to follow the singlehood or cohabitation trajectories.
Conversely, the traditional marriage and children pattern (leaving
home to get married immediately before having children in a ﬁve-year
time span) is less likely among those with highly educated parents.
Unsurprisingly, those with a religiously practicing mother are less likely
to experience trajectories including cohabitation and more likely to
experience marriage trajectories, but less likely to start their transition
by living with a partner and/or children in the parental home. Hence,
having a practicing mother tends to lead to more traditional patterns.
Finally, the time-varying covariate parental divorce has a strong eﬀect
on trajectories into adulthood for men and women. Individuals with
divorced parents are more likely to follow a cohabitation trajectory.
Furthermore, sons of divorced parents are more likely to follow a sin-
glehood trajectory.
5. Conclusion
Family formation processes have changed dramatically over the past
decades. Not only have many demographic events been postponed, but
some events that were less common in the past, such as unmarried
cohabitation and divorce, have gained in popularity. Essentially, this
has led to a destandardization of demographic trajectories into adult-
hood, which has been linked to long-term changes in societal condi-
tions. Cultural narratives emphasize that secularization and in-
dividualization have led young adults to increasingly prefer autonomy,
and this implies decreased commitment to a partner and children.
Consequently, young adults postpone marriage and parenthood and opt
for singlehood and unmarried cohabitation instead. Economic narra-
tives emphasize that in economically bad times, opportunities for young
adults to commit to a partner and children decline. As a result, young
adults are assumed to postpone far-reaching and potentially irreversible
demographic decisions during these times. The aim of this paper was to
test the role of long-term period inﬂuences on the family formation
process. We did so by studying changes in this process among Dutch
Fig. 5. Evolution of the hazard of starting each type of family formation trajectory by gender and level of secularizationa. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
aEach line depicts the hazard of starting a particular trajectory at a given age. The hazard is computed for a person with a reference proﬁle that includes average youth unemployment
rate, average parental education level, non-practicing mother, and non-divorced parents. A separate panel is used for men and women in the context of low or high secularization. The
lines are comparable across panels, but interpretation should be done with caution as no information about statistical signiﬁcance is provided.
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young adults between 1970 and 2008.
To test our hypotheses about the link between secularization and
youth unemployment and the demographic transition into adulthood,
we conducted a Competing Trajectories Analysis (CTA), a novel com-
bination of SA and EHA. First, we conducted a SA to distinguish dif-
ferent trajectories starting at the time of the ﬁrst demographic event in
that transition (usually leaving home). Next, the trajectories were em-
ployed as competing destinations in a competing-risks EHA, which in-
cludes both time-constant and time-varying covariates inﬂuencing the
timing of the start of the family formation process and the type of
trajectory upon entry.
Our SA on the family formation trajectories during the ﬁrst ﬁve
years after Dutch young adults experienced their ﬁrst demographic
event distinguished seven trajectories. Excluding 10 percent of censored
respondents, about one third of young adults experienced one of the
two more traditional trajectories of marriage (15%) and marriage and
children (17%). Next, three trajectories included cohabitation in the
form of singlehood-cohabitation (9%), cohabitation (16%), and coha-
bitation-marriage (6%). The singlehood (32%) trajectory includes
young adults who leave home, but do not yet commit to a partner or
children. Finally, a seventh trajectory included young adults who ex-
perienced an event like cohabitation or marriage or parenthood, but
remained at the parental home (7%).
The results of the event history models are in line with our hy-
potheses regarding the inﬂuence of secularization on demographic
trajectories into young adulthood. The inﬂuence of secularization on
the timing of the start of the family formation process was limited to
men, who in more secularized times are more reluctant to start family
formation than in less secularized times. In the competing trajectories
model, much stronger eﬀects of secularization were observed for the
type of trajectories young adults opt for. In more secularized times,
trajectories asking for a strong commitment to a partner and children
are less popular. Both among men and women, the marriage and
marriage and children trajectories become less popular in more secu-
larized times. At the same time, trajectories that are more reversible
and require less commitment become more popular the more secular-
ized Dutch society becomes. This is true for the singlehood and coha-
bitation trajectories for women, and singlehood-cohabitation,
cohabitation, and cohabitation-marriage trajectories for men. These
results are in line with the central ideas derived from the Second
Demographic Transition theory, that in times of secularization young
adults are more reluctant to give up their autonomy and therefore
spend more time in singlehood and unmarried cohabitation during
young adulthood.
The results also support the idea that economic circumstances in-
ﬂuence family formation trajectories. Aligned to Hypothesis 3, the start
of this process is postponed during times of high youth unemployment.
The eﬀects of youth unemployment on the types of trajectories taken
are less pronounced, but also aligned to expectations. Among women,
both the singlehood and marriage and children trajectories become less
likely with increasing levels of youth unemployment. The decrease in
the likelihood of the singlehood trajectory suggests that women may
lack resources during economically bad times to establish an in-
dependent household, whereas the decrease in the likelihood of the
marriage and children trajectory appears to indicate that they postpone
childbearing until a later stage in the transition to adulthood. Both
ﬁndings suggest that decreased (ﬁnancial) opportunities during eco-
nomically bad times weaken family commitments. Among men, the
picture is less clear; the higher the level of youth unemployment, the
higher the rate at which they enter the cohabitation-marriage and
marriage trajectories. Still, the results in Fig. 6 indicate that the increase
in these trajectories is mainly at the expense of the marriage and chil-
dren trajectories. Overall, these results support our fourth hypothesis.
There are some limitations to this study. First, although our pro-
posed method includes time-varying covariates, it is unable to consider
the impact of these during the ﬁve years we studied family formation
trajectories. Individuals are likely to diﬀer in their ability to plan. Some
may have a general idea about what they hope to achieve in the next
ﬁve years, while others may have no idea. Second, the family formation
process often takes more than ﬁve years to complete. For some in-
dividuals, we only observed the beginning rather than the full process.
However, little change in eﬀects was found if the time-span we studied
was increased to six years or decreased to four. Third, we were unable
to test the theoretical mechanisms behind our hypotheses. In our hy-
potheses, we link the choice for marriage and children to levels of
commitment and irreversibility, but have no information on why
Fig. 6. Evolution of the hazard of starting each type of family formation trajectory by gender and level of unemploymenta. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
aEach line depicts the hazard of starting a particular trajectory at a given age. The hazard is computed for a person with a reference proﬁle that includes average level of secularization,
average parental education level, non-practicing mother, and non-divorced parents. The lines are comparable across panels, but interpretation should be done with caution as no
information about statistical signiﬁcance is provided.
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individuals choose diﬀerent pathways to adulthood. For example, an
important reason why marriage and parenthood is postponed may be a
perceived lack of resources to aﬀord marriage and children, but it could
also be a lack of willingness to commit. Future research could examine
how macro-indicators inﬂuence intentions of fertility and the reasons
for postponement. Thus, this approach can only show a relationship
between macro-level developments and individual-level family forma-
tion decision processes. It cannot test causal claims, as we do not ex-
amine the mechanisms linking the macro-level developments to the
family formation decision processes. Finally, we only examined the role
of secularization and youth unemployment in changing patterns of fa-
mily formation. Other factors could be important as well. In the ap-
pendix, we examined the role of educational expansion, by adding a
synthetic time-varying educational attainment variable to our models.
Results show that in the Netherlands, higher educated young adults
leave the parental home earlier than lower educated young adults, but
that the higher educated are more reluctant to commit. However, in
these analyses, the eﬀects of secularization and youth unemployment
remained quite similar to those presented in the main analyses. This
suggests that educational expansion could have an impact on macro-
level changes in family formation processes, but in addition to, rather
than at the expense of, changes in levels of secularization and youth
unemployment.
Overall, our ﬁndings support both cultural and economic narratives
on changes in demographic trajectories into adulthood. Essentially, the
inﬂuence of secularization seems more pervasive than that of youth
unemployment. This suggests that changes in family formation pro-
cesses among Dutch young adults in the last half a century are driven
more strongly by a decreased preference for early commitment to fa-
mily life than by a decrease in opportunities to commit to family life.
Future research should examine what are the current drivers of family
formation change. We speculate that future changes in family life tra-
jectories will more likely be driven by economic rather than cultural
change. First, levels of religiosity in the Netherlands appear to have
stabilized (see Fig. 1), indicating that the secularization process may
have reached an end. Second, we only studied changes in the family
formation process until 2008, and it is likely that the impact of eco-
nomic insecurity in the wake of the Great Recession has been even
stronger than during the economically diﬃcult times observed between
1970 and 2008. Indeed, in the Netherlands, it was found that during the
ﬁrst years of the latest economic recession young adults postponed
marriage and parenthood (De Beer, 2012). Thus, the relative im-
portance of the cultural and economic factors may change over time,
and it will be interesting to examine how strong both developments are
related to family formation patterns during the years of the Great Re-
cession and its aftermath.
To study the inﬂuence of time-varying cultural and economic
macro-indicators, we introduced Competing Trajectories Analysis
(CTA), an innovative procedure that combines SA and EHA. SA and
EHA have long been viewed as distinct approaches to modeling life
courses; however, our analysis suggests that promising ways exist to
combine these approaches. Several features of this approach are worth
mentioning. One shortcoming of SA is that typologies are often domi-
nated by diﬀerences in the timing of the ﬁrst relevant event. Our ap-
proach allowed us to circumvent this problem, as we focused on the
event sequences that occur after the ﬁrst event in family formation
process is experienced. This enables a typology that focuses on diﬀer-
ences in types of events and their order, rather than on timing. Another
limitation of SA is that it is diﬃcult to incorporate time-varying in-
formation. Our approach provides an option to address this issue.
Clearly, whether it makes sense to do so depends on our knowledge
about the time span during which time-varying factors inﬂuence the
process being studied. In this application, we assumed that macro-fac-
tors inﬂuence demographic trajectories during a period of up to ﬁve
years. This assumption can easily be tested by varying the time span of
the sub-sequences to be analyzed. In addition to analyzing time-varying
macro-level variables, it is also possible to include time-varying micro-
level variables. In our application, we included parental divorce as a
time-varying variable, but other variables such as educational enroll-
ment and employment status can also be included. Finally, this com-
bination allows for the inclusion of censored trajectories in the analysis,
a common issue when using SA. A limitation of EHA tackled by this
approach is that it is often viewed as focusing on one speciﬁc event at a
time. Our approach relaxes this assumption by studying transition-to-
adulthood trajectories young adults embark on once they make their
ﬁrst move into adulthood.
In this study, we focused on understanding temporal changes in
family formation trajectories. However, this approach could also be
fruitfully applied to spatial variation in such patterns. Countries, and
regions within countries, vary in their level of secularization and in
their socio-economic development. For instance, one could explore this
regional variation to examine whether young adults in more secularized
regions follow less standardized family formation trajectories. One
could even combine spatial and historical variation to examine whether
the same macro-factors are correlated with changes over time and with
diﬀerences across space. Through these comparative approaches, life-
course researchers may better understand societal inﬂuences that shape
the transition to adulthood.
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